Psychosomatics - Gérard Szwec, Pierre Marty (in French)
Gérard Szwec "The forced labor repetition"
The tendency to repetition can become so cumbersome and take up so much space in the life of individuals, one is tempted to compare to the convicts, slaves or convicts. Repetition home, never ends, because it provides an unsatisfactory response to a massive influx excitement they can neither develop nor to unload. This inability leads to repeat again and again. They are busy and seem compelled to do it all the time, running, rowing or practicing another activity, provided that it is mechanical, and it does involve motor behaviors or sensory perceptions, or both.
Pierre Marty "Mentalizing and psychosomatic"
The individuals we are often subject to a number of excitations of our instincts and our impulses. Events and mistletoe situations before us, more or less important in their appearance, touch our emotions and trigger these excitations that need to unload or sell. Our main possibilities flow and discharge resident of a share in a mental development work excitations felt the other in motor behavior and sensory differently or not related to mental work. One can generally move when the excitations that occur as we do not discharge or do not flow, they accumulate and eventually reach somatic devices pathologically.
Pierre Marty, Michel de M'Uzan, .. "Investigation psychosomatic. observation 5"
o Sit down and tell me.
• What do you want me to answer you, Doctor? I am extremely nervous, I'm emotional.
o Yes ...
• I do not know what to tell you ...
o Well that, that ... what do you mean? "I'm extremely nervous, I am emotional," ... like there, what happens? (1)
Jean-Franзois Chevrier The hallucination artistic
Permanent reinvention of a body of writing, the prose poem Rimbaud is an embodiment of lyricism, and a transposition of the theatrical incarnation of speech. Theatricality, in all its forms, haunts the Illuminations. In A Season in Hell, LED adventure leads to experience a "fabulous opera" which operate metamorphoses and multiplication of identities: "Every being, several other lives seemed due 1" The opera, renewed Wagner, is the spectacular model of poetic polyphony; Rimbaud combines with various forms of amusement: trestles theater, commedia dell'arte, mime, circus parade. He imagines prodigious scenes. Bric-a-brac imagination was ordinary mid-mid-high culture popular in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Articles teachers and students of the institute (in Russian)
In the 50s of the twentieth century, French psychoanalysts identiﬁ ed and described a separate group of patients with psychosomatic functioning. These are patients with essential depression, deﬁ ciency of primary narcissism, poor oniric and fantasmatic life, practically incapable of grieving. Narcissistic losses (social status, respect) are more dangerous for them than object losses, since they lead to the leakage of already insufﬁ cient narcissism and, as a consequence, to somatization. In some patients, the news of a serious diagnosis leads to a spiritual uplift, a surge of strength, a state resembling manic excitement. However, it is fundamentally different from this and is called the psychosomatic paradox.
The analyst is the guarantor of the setting; professionalism helps the analyst resist the patient's endless attacks on the frame. In choosing a frame, the analyst should think it over well. A frame off ered by the analyst to the patient without regard for their early trauma can lead to severe consequences as actings and somatizations.
The setting as a component of psychoanalysis is crucial for development this entire process and becomes a full participant therapeutic actions. It is customary to talk about the value of the setting for the patient. Let's start with the general scientifi c concepts of postmodernism, relevant to the current scientifi c paradigm. From the concepts of the anthropic principle, Boltzmann's brain, chaos theories, to move on to more specifi c ones for psychoanalysis development analyst condition and the eff ect of such a state on the psychoanalytic process as a whole.
Psychosomatic functioning is liminal, transitional and can be placed between borderline and psychotic. This functioning is characterized by a meager onyrical and phantasmatic life. The ability to mentalize, associative thinking is poorly expressed, moreover, according to A. Green they have a central phobic position in the form of avoidance of associativeness. Such avoidance leads to mental mortiﬁ cation, the extreme expression of which is a marginal version of psychosomatic functioning – operativeness, machine-likeness. Dreams of such patients are either absent, or amaze with their scarcity and deserted spaces (the patient himself, people and living creatures are absent in such kinds of dreams). Often, we observe recurring dreams – traumatic, reproducing real traumas of the past. "Raw" dreams are presented as an undisguised realization of drives, without the slightest sign of mental elaboration.
The psychoanalytic theory of dreams was presented the ﬁ rst theory of the drives of Freud and she wasn't ﬁ t enough to the new topographic model the model and the new clinic, which is dominated by self – destructiveness and destructiveness. The mechanisms of dreaming are presented to a greater extent visual ability the dream process. Ability to translate thoughts into visual images, perception, sense, mnestic traces, what allows the subject to integrate into his own self his "memory without memories".
A presentation made at the 1st European Conference on Analytic Psychology “Dialogue at the Threshold Between East and West: Cultural Identity Past, Present and Future”. Vilnius, 2009
Depressive personalities are those whose characterological patterns are produced by depressive dynamics. However the main organizing issues, expectations, fears, conflicts and unconscious constructs of depressive and manic people are similar.
Antology of Modern Psychoanalysis (in Russian)
The dream is inherently—in appearance at least—a narcissistic phenomenon, entirely intrapsychic. The actors and the audience are alike the dreamer; the ultimate purpose of the action is to preserve the most narcissistic of mental states, sleep. Nevertheless, there are communicative elements about the dream and, as will be set forth in this paper, within the dream itself that are of great importance not only for the therapeutic approach but for the theoretical formulation of dream psychology.
It is well known that infants as soon as they are born tend to use fist, fingers, thumbs in stimulation of the oral erotogenic zone, in satisfaction of the instincts at that zone, and also in quiet union. It is also well known that after a few months infants of either sex become fond of playing with dolls, and that most mothers allow their infants some special object and expect them to become, as it were, addicted to such objects.
There is a relationship between these two sets of phenomena that are separated by a time interval, and a study of the development from the earlier into the later can be profitable, and can make use of important clinical material that has been somewhat neglected.
I wish to make an examination of the capacity of the individual to be alone, acting on the assumption that this capacity is one of the most important signs of maturity in emotional development.
In almost all our psycho-analytic treatments there come times when the ability to be alone is important to the patient. Clinically this may be represented by a silent phase or a silent session, and this silence, far from being evidence of resistance, turns out to be an achievement on the part of the patient. Perhaps it is here that the patient has been able to be alone for the first time. It is to this aspect of the transference in which the patient is alone in the analytic session that I wish to draw attention.
In this paper I propose to put forward for discussion the idea of the use of an object. The allied subject of relating to objects seems to me to have had our full attention. The idea of the use of an object has not, however, been so much examined, and it may not even have been specifically studied.
This work on the use of an object arises out of my clinical experience and is in the direct line of development that is peculiarly mine. I cannot assume, of course, that the way my ideas have developed has been followed by others, but I would like to point out that there has been a sequence, and the order that there may be in the sequence belongs to the evolution of my work.
My work on transitional objects and phenomena which followed on naturally after 'The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation' (Winnicott, 1941) is fairly well known. Obviously the idea of the use of an object is related to the capacity to play. I have recently given attention to the subject of creative playing (Winnicott, 1968a).
Until recently an infant of the age of 13 months did not interest psychiatrists mainly because an infant was considered an instrument for digestion without any psychical life at least until his first baby-talk appeared. Experienced women insisted upon their knowledge in vain: all that was considered old wives’ tales.
At the same time in the industrially developed countries it was believed that infant death rate which was still high could be reduced if a child were protected from infection when being treated and especially during illness. Before World War II nannies wore masks for everyday care of infants in day nurseries and other places where children spent parts of a day.
A patient states: “I have lost my object attachment”. He is talking about a toy which he now has in mind, a fire fighter car with which he played when he was four years old; it was read, metal and playing with it he hurt his hand; upon turning the handle it was possible to raise the ladder, “a real phallus”. But he does not know what happened to that car. Hence his statement about a loss. In the beginning of a session he talked about his dream: he arrives at a railway station in the town where his mother, a widow, lives; he leaves at the luggage office a huge knapsack, then in the cellar of his house books are sitting in the drawers filled with sand. I offered a hypothesis according to which this dream means a desire to give up difficult responsibilities of life and return naked to his mother. But the memory of this toy from the childhood filled with allegoric and metaphoric value (fire fighter, ladder, red, wound) comes to him at the end of the session and demonstrates that the remote recollection makes possible a representation – and an “exposition” – of conflict bonds with the object of love, mother, and with childhood sexual emotions. Are these bonds a simple attachment?
The adherents of the theory of object relations, interpersonal theory, self psychology, and intersubjectivists have been constantly criticizing traditional psychoanalytic techniques of treatment for having in their foundation a theory of pathology oriented exclusively on drives and not on object relations. In a sense this opinion can be called just but the principles of psychoanalytic methods should be considered from a historical perspective. It is known that in 1914 Freud attempted to define the influence that object relations have on man’s behavior and in particular on the development of symptoms. As usual Freud did not try to put an end to the discussion but considered his attempt as the first step in researching this phenomenon…
According to Freud a transference takes place as a result of an unresolved unconscious conflict. An analytic treatment of neurotics presupposes a capability to analyze a certain type of transference. Gradually we arrive at a conclusion that a transference is an effect of the analytic situation itself (then the analysis is carried out in the frames of transference). Can we go further and examine the beginning of transference directly in the context of analysis (this will mean that we are approaching to the revelation of the aspects necessary for a characterization of the object)? At first the phenomenon of counter-transference has been looked at with suspicion. Now counter-transference is receiving more and more attention at it is being recognized as a fundamental means of an analytic process which allows to “meet” one’s unconscious. From one extreme to the other.
Classic Psychoanalysis - Sigmund Freud (in Russian)
In the summer vacation of the year 189* I made an excursion into the Hohe Tauern1 so that for a while I might forget medicine and more particularly the neuroses. I had almost succeeded in this when one day I turned aside from the main road to climb a mountain which lay somewhat apart and which was renowned for its views and for its well-run refuge hut. I reached the top after a strenuous climb and, feeling refreshed and rested, was sitting deep in contemplation of the charm of the distant prospect. I was so lost in thought that at first I did not connect it with myself when these words reached my ears: ‘Are you a doctor, sir?’
Melancholia, whose definition fluctuates even in descriptive psychiatry, takes on various clinical forms the grouping together of which into a single unity does not seem to be established with certainty; and some of these forms suggest somatic rather than psychogenic affections. Our material, apart from such impressions as are open to every observer, is limited to a small number of cases whose psychogenic nature was indisputable. We shall, therefore, from the outset drop all claim to general validity for our conclusions, and we shall console ourselves by reflecting that, with the means of investigation at our disposal to-day, we could hardly discover anything that was not typical, if not of a whole class of disorders, at least of a small group of them.
We have often heard that science must be built on the foundation of clear and exactly formulated theses. In reality no science, even the most exact, ever starts with such definitions. A real beginning of a scientific work consists in a description of phenomena which are later grouped and put in order and in joint relation. But even during the description one cannot avoid while processing the material the help of some abstract ideas taken from some other sources which by no means are located outside the realm of the new experience. Even more necessary are the ideas from which basic scientific notions are later developed during further processing of the material. At first they have to stay to a certain extent undefined; a more clear and exact limitation of their content is out of question. While they remain in this state their sense is defined by a constant reference to the material of experience which seems to be the foundation of their development whereas in reality it is this very material which submits to them. Strictly speaking they have a conditional character but the most important essence consists in the fact that they are not chosen randomly and the decisive importance in their choice lies in their relation to the empirical material and this relation is presupposed earlier than it can be definitely established and proved. Only after having thoroughly analyzed all the realm of investigated phenomena appears a possibility to exactly define all the basic scientific notions and to change them consecutively so that they can be used to a great extent and that they become free from contradictions. At this point their exact definition becomes well-timed. But the progress in cognition does not stand hardened formal definitions. As a bright example from physics shows even exactly defined notions are subject to constant change of their content.
A drive becomes one such conditional basic notion which is at this time vague but is indispensable for psychology.